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Abstract 
 
 
 In the framework of the current global economic crisis, a pertinent question is 
whether the world economies are suffering from contagion or interdependency effects. 
With its origins in the US sub-prime mortgage market crisis starting at the end of 2007, 
when a loss of confidence by investors in the value of securitized mortgages resulted in a 
liquidity crisis, hard-hitting the banking system and rapidly spreading into the financial 
markets, the effects of the crisis were automatically reflected in the rest of the world 
economies. These effects that become severe as the rest of the world has been facing its 
economic and financial system instability. Therefore, the American shock can be seen as 
the trigger that revealed the other economies’ own financial problems. This paper’s main 
finding shows that the US stock markets are not generating contagious effects into the 
Asian stock markets. However, strong evidence suggesting volatility transmissions 
derived from these economies interlinkages has been detected. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Since the mid-1990s, international financial markets have experienced several 
episodes of economic and financial distress. The major financial crises observed in recent 
years were located in diverse regions, from Mexico in December 1994, to Asia beginning 
in July 1997 (with the devaluation of the Thai baht), Russia in August 1998, the USA in 
September 1998 (with the near-collapse of the U.S hedge fund Long-Term Capital 
Management), Brazil towards the end of 1998 and early 1999, and lately, Turkey, and 
Argentina in 2001 (Dungey et.al, 2002). During these crises, financial markets’ 
interactions and interlinkages played a crucial role, as the high level of integration 
between countries, and between their financial markets were a major source of spillover 
effects, that led to extreme volatility in the world’s financial markets. In this regard, 
financial instability and contagion are typically viewed as a developing country 
phenomenon; however, the current global financial crisis endured by the world leading 
economies suggests that this is not necessarily the case, and makes us wonder about the 
causes that have driven this economic downturn and that may be summarised as follow: i) 
lack of regulation, ii) lack of transparency, iii) and information asymmetry. 
The current economic and financial crisis emerged after the US housing prices 
dropped moderately in 2006-07, and after the US sub-prime mortgage markets 
manifested huge losses. In turn, these generated chaotic effects throughout the 
international financial system. Afterwards, the crisis spread with amazing speed to other 
markets, and even to financial institutions that had no direct exposure to the subprime 
mortgage market. The confidence in many financial institutions was strongly damaged 
and share prices for investment banks dropped significantly at the end of 2007 and early 
2008. Taking these facts into consideration, the current analysis will look at contagion 
effects originating from the United States stock markets and spreading into some selected 
Asian economies (mature and emerging economies), for, as posited in this paper, the 
current financial turmoil is affecting Asian economies in a different manner. Indeed, 
given that the region was heavily affected during the 1997-1998 Asian crisis, several 
policy instruments such as the Chiang Mai Initiative have enabled the Asian markets to 
be in a better fashion and to be better prepared for coping with the current situation, than 
most of the world economies. As a result, our expectation is based on the hypothesis that 
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no contagion effects would be detected in the Asian region. On the other hand, these 
markets are not totally immune to the current global crisis, so another a priori expectation 
is to find strong volatility spillovers effects derived from the high interdependence that 
exists between the Asian and US markets.  
The existing literature presents a number of controversies regarding the 
identification of financial contagious effects. Considering that these effects tend to be 
associated with a high level of interdependence among markets, what could simply be 
emerging is an increase in the interlinkages among those markets, and not necessarily   
contagion effects per se. This differentiation acquires a great level of importance during 
times of crises, where markets are characterised by high levels of volatility, and where 
countries appear to be more vulnerable to contagion or transmission effects, which 
propagate across regions, with global effects such as in the case of the current crisis. 
Thus, it is pertinent to wonder whether the US financial system did generate contagious 
effects to the Asian economies, or whether we are just facing markets’ reactions derived 
from the US and Asian markets interlinkages. Therefore, the main objective of this paper 
is to look at contagion effects from the U.S stock markets (Dow Jones Industrials, and 
S&P 500) to the stock markets of some Asian emerging and more mature economies 
(China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Thailand).  
The remainder of this paper is organised into the following sections: i) First, a 
brief review regarding contagion and interdependence studies is presented; ii) second the 
data and methodology are outlined; iii) third, the empirical findings are presented and 
discussed, and iv) finally, the  paper concludes, and some suggestions for further research 
are discussed. 
 
2. Contagion or Interdependence Effects  
 
Economic integration of an individual country into the world markets typically 
involves both trade and financial links. Thus, a financial crisis in one country can lead to 
direct financial effects, including reductions in trade credits, in foreign direct investment 
flows, and in other capital flows abroad. As a consequence, the spread of a crisis depends 
on the degree of financial market integration. The higher the degree of integration, and 
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the more extensive the contagious effects of a common stock, or a real shock to another 
country. Thus, financial markets facilitate the transmission of real or common shocks, but 
they do not cause them. Some observers argue that contagion is a consequence of sudden 
shifts in market expectations and confidence, a situation that was clearly faced by 
international markets in late 2007, and early 2009. Empirical examinations of the 
evidence on contagion have focused mainly on co-movements in assess prices rather than 
on “excessive” co-movements in capital flows or disturbances in real markets (Calvo and 
Reinheart, 1996; Frankel and Schumulker, 1998; Valde’s, 1997; Agenor et al. 1999, Baig 
and Goldfajn, 1999). 
When looking for a definition for contagion, the literature shows great 
disagreement in this regard, but in our opinion the best definition is the one proposed by 
Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000). According to these authors, ‘contagion is a 
significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to an individual country (or 
group of countries), as measured by the degree to which asset prices or financial flows 
move together across markets relative to this co-movement in tranquil times’ (op. cit, p. 
178). This definition is far from being universally accepted, with some economists 
arguing that any transmission of a shock constitutes contagion, whether or not correlation 
increases, with others requiring a demonstration of mechanisms of actions. However, 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) make a compelling argument that previous statistical tests for 
contagion were biased because the correlation coefficients are conditional on volatility 
(that is, heteroskedastic); and therefore, the crisis simply reflected an interdependence 
that was present even before the crisis. 
Dungey, Fry, and Martin (2003), analyse the linkages between daily Asian and 
Australian equity markets returns over the period 1995-2001 within the framework of a 
latent factor model. Their empirical results reveal that co-movements in Asian and 
Australian equity markets are largely determined by interdependent linkages arising from 
common systemic factors. There is little significant evidence of contagion, although 
negative shocks have more effect than positive ones. 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2005), analyse volatility spillovers across markets during 
and after the two major emerging market crises (the East Asian, and the Russian). The 
major findings show that there was substantial increase in the volatility spillovers across 
markets, as a result of increased market integration in the nineties; stock markets around 
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the world had become more interdependent, as captured by the steady increase in return 
stock spillovers in the mid 1990s. Volatility contagion is important because it means that 
the risks faced by stock investors will be higher in other markets if there is volatility 
contagion. If one country is suffering from a financial crisis, this problem may spread to 
another country because of the presence of underlying conditions that make the other 
country vulnerable, and as a consequence these economies will be dragged into a 
downward spiral. Nonetheless, countries with healthy economies are also susceptible to 
the turmoil, as discussed by Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000). This is due to the fact 
that there are three main channels for financial contagion, namely trade links, financial 
links and competitive devaluations. Thus, a healthy economy can be affected in any of 
these ways; therefore, contagious and interdependency analysis is a matter of great 
importance. 
Iwatsubo and Ingaki (2007) investigate stock market contagion between US and 
Asian markets, using NYSE-traded stocks issued by Asian firms. They find significant 
bilateral contagion effects in returns and return volatility, and also, that contagion effects 
from the US market to the Asian markets are stronger than in the reverse direction, 
indicating that the US market plays a major role in the transmission of information to 
foreign markets. The intensity of contagion was significantly greater during the Asian 
financial crisis rather than after the crisis.  
There is a reasonable large body of empirical studies testing for the existence of 
financial contagion during financial crises. Although a range of different methodologies 
have been presented to analyse contagion effects, there is no theoretical or empirical 
procedure for indentifying contagion on which researchers agree. Latent factor model, 
(Bekaert, Harvey and Ng, 2005), correlation analysis (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), VAR 
(Fravero and Giovazzi, 2002), and probability theory (Eicheyreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 
1995) are different methodologies proposed in the literature.   
In the current analysis, we will consider the concept of pure contagion, which is 
related to changes in international investors’ behaviour; it is not caused by systematic or 
mechanical changes in their portfolio composition, but it is caused by shifts in their 
perception towards market risk. This group of studies use the following terms: herd 
behaviour, informational cascades, demonstration effect, wake-up call, etc. Some 
researchers such as Rigobon (1998) and Masson (1998) define contagion as this channel 
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only. The basic idea behind all these terms is that a crisis in one country can provide 
information to investors and change the market sentiments or their interpretation of 
market situations.  
 
3. Empirical Framework 
 
3.1 Data 
 
This analysis uses daily data on the Asian major stock markets: China (Shenzhen 
Se and Shangai Se), Hong Kong (Hang Seng), India (Sensex 30), Indonesia (Jakarta Se 
composite), Japan (Nikkei 225), Malaysia (KLCI composite), Singapore (STI), South 
Korea (Korea Se composite), Taiwan (Taiwan Se Weighted), and Thailand (Bangkok 
SET), and the US market (Dow Jones Industrials, and S&P 500). The sample period 
covers 2003 through 2009, which is divided in two subsamples in order to analyse how 
the markets were reacting during a tranquil time period (from the 1st of January, 2003 to 
the 15th of October, 2007), and what happened after the financial system entered into 
times of difficulties; this latter period is identified as the crisis period (16th of October, 
2007 to 30th of May 2009)3. All data are taken from DataStream. The analysis focuses on 
the stock market assessment of volatility effects captured by daily stock returns 
movements for the countries included in the study. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
The main objective of this research is to identify whether or not there is a 
substantial increase in cross-market linkages, following a shock from the American stock 
markets to a group of Asian countries. Thus, our main goal is to test whether there is a 
rise in correlations between markets after the shock took place. Considering that stock 
markets are one of the main channels for shock transmission, we consider appropriate to 
start the analysis looking at the major reactions generated from this channel.  
                                                 
3
 The Chow test was employed to detect structural instabilities in the markets. For more details see Figure 1 
in the appendix. 
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We obtain two different measures of correlation for the US stock returns and the 
Asian nations. First, we compute and compare cross-market correlations for the stock 
returns, during both the crisis and the tranquil periods. The methodology under use is the 
one developed by Forbes and Rigobon (1999) and Baig and Goldfajn (1999). Thus, we 
divide our original sample into two subsamples, in order to check whether correlations 
are significantly different during the two sub-periods. 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) define contagion as the increase in correlation 
between two variables during a crisis period. In performing their test, the correlation 
between the two asset returns during the crisis period is adjusted to overcome the 
problem that correlations are a positive function of volatility. As crisis periods are 
typically characterised by an increase in volatility, a test based on the (conditional) 
correlation is biased upwards resulting in evidence of spurious contagion. The correlation 
coefficients proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) can be placed conveniently within a 
bivariate regression framework whereby the underlying variables are scaled 
appropriately. 
To demonstrate the steps needed to implement the Forbes and Ribogon (2002) 
approach, we test for contagion from country 14 to country 2. The correlation between the 
asset returns of the two asset markets during the crisis period (high volatility period) is: 
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represents the corresponding correlation in the pre-crisis or tranquil period (low volatility 
period). If there is an increase in the volatility in the asset return of country 1, 2 1,2 1, xy σσ > , 
                                                 
4
 Country one represents the country where the shock originates, and country two represent the country that 
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without there being any change to the fundamental relationship between the asset returns 
in the two markets, then xy ρρ > , giving the false appearance of contagion. To adjust for 
this bias, Forbes and Rigobon show that the adjusted (unconditional) correlation is given 
by: 
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This is the unconditional correlation ( yυ ) which is the conditional correlation 
( yρ ) scaled by a nonlinear function of the percentage change in volatility in the asset 
return of the source country (( 2 1,2 1,2 1, /) xxy σσσ − ), country 15 in this case, over the high and 
low volatility periods. This adjustment allows for a levels shift in the volatility of asset 1, 
whereby xy ρυ =  if there is no fundamental change in the relationship between two asset 
markets. To test that there is a significant change in correlation, the null hypothesis 
is, yyH ρυ =:0 , where  xρ  and yυ  are defined as in the previous equations. 
Another way to implement the Forbes and Rigobon test of contagion is to scale 
the asset returns and perform the contagion test within a regression framework. This 
approach not only provides insights into ways in which the testing framework can be 
generalized, but also, it offers insights into its relationships with other contagion testing 
procedures. Continuing with the example of testing for contagion from the asset market 
of country 1 to the asset market of country 26, consider scaling the asset returns during 
the pre-crisis period by their respective standard deviations. We can then define the 
following regression equation in terms of the scaled asset returns: 
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500. 
6
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where tx,η  is a disturbance term and 0α and 1α  are regression parameters. The pre-crisis 
slope regression parameter is related to the pre-crisis correlation coefficient as xρα =1 . 
We define the following regression equation for the crisis returns, except that the 
scaling of asset returns is still done by the respective standard deviation from the pre-
crisis periods: 
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where ty,η  is a disturbance term and 0β and 1β  are regression parameters. The crisis 
regression slope parameter 1β  is equivalent to yυβ =1 , which is the Forbes-Rigobon 
(2002) adjusted correlation coefficient given in the previous equation. 
Equations (4) and (5) suggest that another way to implement the Forbes-Rigobon 
adjusted correlation is to estimate (4) and (5) by OLS and test the equality of the 
regression slope parameters (this regression approach is the one used to check for 
contagion effects in this paper). This test is equivalent to a Chow test for a structural 
break of the regression slope. Implementation of the test can be based on the following 
pooled regression equation over the entire sample, 
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,2,1,,2,1, ),...,;,...,,( yx TiiiTiiii yyyxxxz = , with i referring to either country, i.e: i = 1,2  
and iz  representing the (Tx+Ty)x1 scaled pooled data set by stacking the pre-crisis and 
crisis scaled data; dt is a slope dummy variable defined as: 
              
               1 : t > Tx 
                    0 : otherwise 
 
dt = 
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and tη  is a disturbance term. The parameter 113 αβγ −=  in equation (6), captures the 
effect of contagion. It represents the additional contribution of information on asset 
returns in country 2 to the pre-crisis regression; if there is no change in the relationship 
the dummy variable provides no new additional information during the crisis period, 
resulting in 03 =γ . Thus the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) contagion test can be 
implemented by estimating equation (6) by OLS and by performing a one-sided t-test of 
0: 30 =γH , in equation (6). This is equivalent to testing 110 : βα =H  in equations (4) 
and (5). Of course, the test statistic to perform the contagion test is invariant to scaling 
transformations of the regressors, such as the use of 1,xσ , and 2,xσ  to standardize tz . This 
would suggest that an even more direct way to test for contagion would have been to 
implement a standard test of parameter constancy in a regression framework simply 
based on tz , the unscaled data
7
.  
We also use a multivariate VAR-EGARCH model specification to investigate 
market interdependence and volatility transmission effects between the countries under 
investigation. The VAR-EGARCH model allows the simultaneous estimation of mean 
and variance equations in both markets. Furthermore, this methodology is free from a 
priori restrictions on the structure of the relationships among the variables investigated, 
and it can be viewed as a flexible reduced form approximation of an unknown correctly 
specified economic structure. The model is expressed as follows, 
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 Our analysis is based on using this model to estimate contagion effects. 
 11 
Equation (7) describes the returns of equity markets in country 1 and country 2, as 
a vector autorregression (VAR), where the conditional mean in each market is 
represented by Rit. Equation (8) describes the conditional variance in each market. Under 
this specification, the estimations of equation (8), (9) and (10) require maximization of 
the log-likelihood function, which is highly non-linear. In this case, we employ the 
algorithm proposed by Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (1974). 
 
4. Findings and analysis 
  
 The major outcomes of this study are presented in two main sections: first we 
analyse the results obtained from the correlation analysis, and also the major findings 
after applying the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) methodology8 to analyse contagious effects 
in stock markets. Afterwards we discuss the VAR-EGARCH methodology9 used to detect 
stock markets interdependencies. 
 
4.1 Contagious Effects 
 
The current analysis starts by looking at the correlation coefficients between 
country 1 (country at the origin of a financial crisis, the US) and country 2 (country 
affected by the financial crisis, the Asian markets). Initially, we have estimated the 
correlation coefficients for the whole sample, and two subsamples. In doing this, we have 
implemented the Chow test for structural stability in the whole sample, where the test 
identifies the 15th of October of 2007 as a major breakpoint for all the markets (Figure 1). 
These two subsamples allow us to identify possible initial signs of contagious effects 
between the US stock markets and some selected Asian stock markets. The results are 
outlined in table 1. The results for the whole sample show that overall, there is a high 
level of correlation between the US and Asian equity markets. The exceptions are the 
Chinese equity markets (Shenzhen Se composite and Shangai Se composite) for which 
the lowest coefficients from the whole sample are found, a situation that is repeated when 
looking at the tranquil and crisis sub periods.  
                                                 
8
 For more details see equation 6, in page 9. 
9
 For more details see equations 7 to 10, in page 10. 
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Through the correlation analysis, we are interested in knowing whether the 
correlation coefficients increased during the crisis time from country 1 to country 2. The 
results show that overall correlation coefficients tend to be lightly higher during the crisis 
period for almost all the markets with the exceptions of the Jakarta Se composite 
(Indonesia) KLCI composite (Malaysia) and Taiwan Se Weighted (Taiwan). These three 
markets behave differently with regard to the rest of the Asian markets, as they are the 
only ones where the correlations coefficients are slightly smaller during the crisis period 
than during the tranquil period. Considering that there is no evidence of an important 
jump among the correlation coefficients for any of the markets under analysis, and taking 
into account the contagious definitions (outlined in the contagious analysis background), 
we are not expecting to find empirical evidence that demonstrates that the Asian markets 
are suffering from contagious effects derived from the US equity markets. 
The results from the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) test (table 2) show that there is 
evidence of contagion effects only for three countries: Hong Kong, India and Thailand, 
results that are consistent when looking at the influence of the Dow Jones Industrials and 
also in the case of the S&P 500. The rest of the markets do not show evidence of 
contagious effects. It is reasonable to think that the Chinese stock market should be the 
one that has the least chances of suffering from contagious effects, due to the limitations 
on inward foreign capital. However, the rest of the Asian markets would be more likely 
to experience contagion, perhaps via herd behaviour or portfolio rebalancing by an 
international investor base, expectations that are not supported by our empirical results. 
Therefore, the main conclusion from this section could be summarised as follows: the US 
equity markets (Dow Jones Industrials, and S&P 500) do not seem to be generating 
contagious effects in the Asian economies, with the three exceptions mentioned above. 
 
4.2 Asian and US Stock Markets Interdependencies’ Effects 
  
 The daily stock returns for each series were calculated as the logarithmic 
difference in the daily price indices, )ln( 1−−= ititit PPR , where R represents the stock 
returns, and P the stock prices per market. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to 
check is our series are stationary, our findings show that all the variables follow an I(0) 
process; therefore we proceed to conduct our VAR-EGARCH analysis, where the main 
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interest is based on the analysis of volatility spillovers effects running from the US stock 
returns (Dow Jones Industrials, and S&P 500) to the selected Asian stock returns. In 
order to be consistent with our contagion analysis, our interdependency modeling will be 
differentiated between the tranquil and crisis period. The analysis starts by selecting the 
appropriate number of lags that would be used in the mean equation (equation 7). In 
doing this, a VAR model between stock returns from country 1 to country 210 is 
implemented, where the Hannan Quinn selection criterion is used. Then, we settled the 
mean equation taking into consideration the optimal number of lags obtained from the 
VAR, and we run the EGARCH model that provides us with information regarding 
volatility persistence, volatility spillovers and asymmetric spillovers effects.  
 
 4.2.1 Volatility Persistence 
 
The results obtained show that volatility persistence is a characteristic of all Asian 
stock returns during the tranquil period (table 3, first and fourth row). When looking at 
the Dow Jones Industrials and S&P 500, the results show that any shock originating in 
the US stock markets tend to have a short lasting effect in the Asian markets as the 
coefficients are very small and in all the cases are far from one. These results are 
surprising as volatility is distinguished for showing clustering behaviour and therefore, 
for having lasting effects in the markets. The results are similar when looking at the crisis 
period (table 4, first and fourth row), where the two indices for China show insignificant 
coefficients, as well as the indices for Malaysia and Thailand with regard to the Dow 
Jones Industrials. In relation to the S&P 500, the results are quite consistent, with the 
only difference being the case of Taiwan which shows insignificant coefficients, while 
Thailand shows significant coefficients. These results are again quite surprising, as it was 
expected that these markets would be showing significant volatility persistence during 
both periods, but in particular during the crisis period, as all the markets would be 
affected by the economic downturn. But it seems that during the tranquil and crisis 
periods, volatility is short-lived in the Asian countries.  
 
                                                 
10
 The results from this test have not been included in the paper due to space limitations, but they are 
available upon request. 
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 4.2.2 Volatility Spillovers 
 
The analysis for volatility spillovers effects during the tranquil period, generated 
from the Dow Jones to the Asian stock returns (table 3, second and fifth row) shows that, 
in most cases, the coefficients are insignificant for both Chinese stock returns, and also 
for Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. In the rest of the cases, the coefficients are 
significant, showing that the US financial downturn is transmitted to Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In terms of the S&P 500 the results are 
consistent with the Dow Jones findings. In the case of China, the results are not 
surprising as they show evidence of independent behaviour of this financial market vis-à-
vis the US one, and as mentioned before, this is explained by the limitations on the 
Chinese stock market to foreign investment. This market is therefore relatively isolated 
from the global turmoil. 
The results for volatility spillovers effects during the crisis period (table 4, second 
and fifth row) from the Dow Jones show that the coefficients are significant for almost all 
the markets, with the exception of Shangai Se composite for China. With regard to the 
S&P 500, the results are consistent with the ones for the Dow Jones; the exception is the 
Taiwan Se Weighted that appears as an insignificant coefficient in this case. These results 
show that the Asian markets are reflecting strong interdependencies with regard to the US 
stock markets during the crisis period. The minor differences obtained with regard to the 
S&P 500 and the Dow Jones can be explained by the indices composition, where few 
Asian countries are affected by the Dow Jones but not much by the S&P 500. Therefore, 
it is possible to conclude that the current economic crisis is not generating contagious 
effects in the Asian stock markets; however, strong evidence exists suggesting that the 
markets are interdependent. 
 
 4.2.3 Asymmetric Spillovers 
 
The results for asymmetric effects during both the tranquil and crisis periods 
(table 3 and 4, third and sixth row) show that asymmetry is present in almost all the 
markets, where almost all the coefficients appear to be significant and where the 
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coefficients magnitude tends to be close to one in most of the cases. Surprisingly, most of 
the coefficients are showing a positive sign. This means that good news are having a 
stronger impact in these markets than negative news, results that make sense during the 
crisis period, as positive news are deemed to have a higher effect in the markets. But 
during tranquil times, negative news tend to generate stronger impacts in the markets than 
positive news.  
 
5. Conclusions and Remarks 
 
 In general, the results suggest that the American crisis is not generating 
contagious effects in the Asian economies. These results are quite interesting, as the US 
equity markets do generate an influence on the Asian economies, but there is a need to 
consider, that after the American economy slowed down, this was only an event that 
triggered Asian financial markets own problems. The analysis pertaining to  
interdependencies between the US and Asian stock returns, shows that there is a strong 
evidence suggesting that these markets are highly integrated. Therefore, shocks affecting 
or generated from the US do have a strong effect in the Asian markets. However, 
interdependency does not necessarily imply contagious effects. As the results show, there 
is no evidence of a jump or big increase in terms of correlations between these markets. 
Therefore, we can conclude that US stock markets have not exercised any contagious 
effects, but they do show interdependencies with Asian markets. 
 The main limitations of this study are in relation to the methodology used to carry 
out this analysis. There is a need to perform alternative tests that allow to verify that the 
results obtained are robust. Future research analysing this issue should be based on 
analysing the world economies, where a division by region would be appropriate, and 
where latent factor models for detecting contagion effects should be used as a 
complement to the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) methodology. This would allow for a 
comparative analysis. 
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7. Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Stock Price Indices 
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          * Graph notation: sp: S&P 500; Dow (Dow Jones Industrials), Shen: (Shenzhen Se and Shangai Se), HK(Hang Seng), Sen     
            (Sensex 30), Jak (Jakarta Se composite), nk (Nikkei 225), Mal (KLCI composite), Si (STI), Ko (Korea Se composite), Ta  
            (Taiwan Se Weighted), and Th (Bangkok SET). 
           
            Structural breaks for all the markets where identified. The Chow test was applied to each of the stock indices, and a common   
            breakpoint was identified to be the 15th October 2007, a time when all the markets started their downturn. 
 
1) Firstly, we run the regression using all the data, before and after the structural break we collected RSSc. 
2) Secondly, we run two separate regressions on the data before and after the structural break, collecting the RSS in both 
cases, giving RSS1 and RSS2. 
 
3) Using these three values we calculate the test statistic from the following formula: 
 
knRSSRSS
kRSSRSSRSS
F c
2/
/)(
21
21
−+
+−
=  
 
4) Then, we find the critical values in the F-test tables, in this case it has F(k,n-2k) degrees of freedom. 
 
5) The null hypothesis is that there is no structural break. We conclude that all the markets suffer from structural break the 
15th of October of 2007. This information is then used in order to implement our contagion (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) 
and VAR-EGARCH interdependency study. 
 
 
 
 
15 Oct 2007 
Breakpoint 
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix 
Price Index Whole Period* Tranquil Period** Crisis Period** 
 Dow Jones Industrials S&P 500 Dow Jones Industrials S&P 500 Dow Jones Industrials S&P 500 
Shenzhen Se Composite 0.61 0.51 0.71 0.61 0.77 0.76 
Hang Seng 0.86 0.81 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 
Sensex 30 0.79 0.75 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Jakarta Se Composite 0.77 0.72 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.96 
Nikkei 225 0.88 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.97 0.98 
Korea Se Composite 0.81 0.78 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.96 
KLCI Composite 0.86 0.82 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.93 
Shangai Se Composite 0.68 0.59 0.75 0.66 0.81 0.80 
STI 0.90 0.86 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99 
Taiwan Se Weighted 0.95 0.92 0.96 0.93 0.94 0.94 
Bangkok SET 0.88 0.88 0.80 0.82 0.97 0.97 
*The whole period is from January 1, 2003 to May 30, 2009; **The tranquil period is from January 1, 2003 to October 15, 
2007;***The crisis period is from October 16, 2007 to May 30, 2009. 
                
                Table 2: Forbes and Rigobon (2002) test results. 
Dow Jones Industrials γ3 t-statistic Contagion? 
Shenzhen Se Composite -0.05 -0.84 N 
Hang Seng 0.18 3.39 Y* 
Sensex 30 0.18 3.41 Y* 
Jakarta Se Composite 0.03 0.49 N 
Nikkei 225 0.04 0.76 N 
Korea Se Composite 0.06 1.19 N 
KLCI Composite 0.07 1.29 N 
Shangai Se Composite -0.02 -0.35 N 
STI 0.08 1.52 N 
Taiwan Se Weighted -0.01 -0.17 N 
Bangkok SET 0.12 2.30 Y** 
    
S&P 500 γ3 t-statistic Contagion? 
 
   
Shenzhen Se Composite -0.04 -0.76 N 
Hang Seng 0.17 3.05 Y* 
Sensex 30 0.16 2.96 Y* 
Jakarta Se Composite 0.03 0.55 N 
Nikkei 225 0.04 0.71 N 
Korea Se Composite 0.06 1.05 N 
KLCI Composite 0.07 1.21 N 
Shangai Se Composite -0.02 -0.31 N 
STI 0.07 1.30 N 
Taiwan Se Weighted -0.02 -0.42 N 
Bangkok SET 0.13 2.42 Y** 
                        *1% significance level; ** 5% significance level.  Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for all stock returns 
                           were implemented; the results obtained showed that the variables are all stationary at levels, therefore  
                           they are an I(0) process, so the results from the Forbes and Rigobon test and VAR-EGARCH are  reliable. 
                          We follow Forbes and Rigobon (2002) methodology to check for contagion effects (see equation 6 in page 7)                           
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Table 3: VAR-EGARCH Results -Tranquil Period 
Estimated Parameters China Hong Kong India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia China Singapore Taiwan Thailand 
Dow Jones Industrials 
 
  
        
 
Volatility Persistence 
(∑ ijα ) 
 
0.1084* 
(0.000) 
0.1683* 
(0.006) 
0.3013* 
(0.000) 
0.1898* 
(0.000) 
0.1576* 
(0.000) 
0.2283* 
(0.000) 
0.1178* 
(0.001) 
0.1758* 
(0.000) 
0.1726* 
(0.000) 
0.3573* 
(0.001) 
0.1084* 
(0.000) 
Volatility Spillover(∑ ijγ ) 
 
0.0161 
(0.397) 
-0.1279* 
(0.001) 
-0.1789* 
(0.000) 
-0.0869* 
(0.000) 
-0.0883* 
(0.005) 
-0.0302* 
(0.001) 
0.0115 
(0.287) 
-0.0351 
(0.602) 
-0.0561 
(0.174) 
-0.2124** 
(0.0309) 
0.0161 
(0.117) 
Asymmetric Spillover 
(∑ ijδ ) 
 
0.9848* 
(0.000) 
0.7798* 
(0.000) 
0.8004* 
(0.000) 
0.9416* 
(0.000) 
0.9521* 
(0.000) 
0.9441* 
(0.000) 
0.9833* 
(0.000) 
0.9724* 
(0.000) 
0.9474* 
(0.000) 
0.3231* 
(0.000) 
0.9848 
(0.254) 
 
S&P 500 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
  
Volatility Persistence 
(∑ ijα ) 
 
0.1093* 
(0.000) 
 
0.1673* 
(0.000) 
0.3166* 
(0.000) 
0.1868* 
(0.000) 
0.1683* 
(0.000) 
0.2257* 
(0.000) 
0.1190* 
(0.000) 
0.1774* 
(0.001) 
0.1821* 
(0.000) 
0.2988* 
(0.000) 
0.1093* 
(0.000) 
Volatility Spillover (∑ ijγ ) 0.0160 (0.402) -0.1223* (0.000) -0.1881* (0.000) -0.0853* (0.000) -0.0901* (0.008) -0.0299* (0.000) 0.0115 (0.296) -0.0342 (0.604) -0.0675 (0.183) -0.2200** (0.012) 0.0160 (0.117) 
Asymmetric Spillover 
(∑ ijδ ) 
0.9845* 
(0.000) 
0.7938* 
(0.000) 
0.7922* 
(0.000) 
0.9489* 
(0.000) 
0.9485* 
(0.000) 
0.9399* 
(0.000) 
0.9828* 
(0.000) 
0.9703* 
(0.000) 
0.9367* 
(0.000) 
0.5085* 
(0.000) 
0.9845** 
(0.011) 
                        *1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; ***10% significance level. The VAR-EGARCH methodology used to analyse interdependencies between each Asian Market, and the           
                          US most representative equity indices is outlined in page 10, where the mean and variance equation used are presented. 
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Table 4: VAR-EGARCH Results - Crisis Period 
 
Estimated Parameters China Hong Kong India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia China Singapore Taiwan Thailand 
Dow Jones Industrials 
 
  
        
 
Volatility Persistence 
(∑ ijα ) 
 
0.1399 
(0.112) 
0.2240* 
(0.000) 
0.2549** 
(0.021) 
0.1294* 
(0.009) 
0.1683** 
(0.018) 
-0.0620* 
(0.000) 
0.2020 
(0.785) 
0.1170 
(0.117) 
0.1003* 
(0.010) 
-0.0122*** 
(0.082) 
0.1399 
(0.632) 
Volatility Spillover(∑ ijγ ) 
 
-0.0882*** 
(0.084) 
-0.1702* 
(0.000) 
-0.2469* 
(0.005) 
-0.1865* 
(0.000) 
-0.1983* 
(0.000) 
-0.1786* 
(0.000) 
0.0908** 
(0.037) 
-0.1825 
(0.292) 
-0.0893* 
(0.000) 
-0.1369*** 
(0.070) 
-0.0882* 
(0.000) 
Asymmetric Spillover 
(∑ ijδ ) 
 
0.8938* 
(0.000) 
0.9512* 
(0.000) 
0.8565* 
(0.000) 
0.9690* 
(0.000) 
0.9691* 
(0.000) 
-0.0733* 
(0.000) 
-0.2294 
(0.962) 
0.9827 
(0.610) 
0.8851* 
(0.000) 
0.9816* 
(0.000) 
0.8938* 
(0.000) 
S&P 500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
Volatility Persistence 
(∑ ijα ) 
 
0.1446 
(0.102) 
0.2163* 
(0.000) 
0.2741** 
(0.024) 
0.6189* 
(0.002) 
0.1712** 
(0.023) 
0.1941* 
(0.000) 
0.2085 
(0.701) 
0.1259 
(0.112) 
0.0811* 
(0.004) 
-0.0428 
(0.104) 
0.1446** 
(0.017) 
Volatility Spillover (∑ ijγ ) 
 
-0.0877*** 
(0.083) 
-0.1773* 
(0.000) 
-0.2424* 
(0.005) 
0.0765* 
(0.000) 
-0.2137* 
(0.000) 
0.0728* 
(0.000) 
0.0951** 
(0.035) 
-0.1870 
(0.270) 
-0.0352* 
(0.000) 
-0.1412 
(0.207) 
-0.0877* 
(0.000) 
Asymmetric Spillover 
(∑ ijδ ) 
0.8976* 
(0.000) 
0.9610* 
(0.000) 
0.8606* 
(0.000) 
0.0241* 
(0.000) 
0.9678* 
(0.000) 
0.0710* 
(0.000) 
-0.1893 
(0.880) 
0.9845 
(0.667) 
0.9808* 
(0.000) 
0.9827* 
(0.000) 
0.8976* 
(0.000) 
                        *1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; ***10% significance level. 
 
 
